Why is epiphenomenalism, which seems so in accord with science, so rejected?

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There seems to be a problem in the philosophy of mind called the Problem of Mental Cause. Where, philosophers debate how to solve the “problem of how apparently immaterial mental events cause purposeful physical actions in the human body”. And one of the theories of the mind that is soon rejected is epiphenomenalism, which postulates that our consciousness is caused by the brain and has no influence on matter. It seems that many philosophers reject this theory, because for them the mind influences matter. But this is absurd. Libet’s experiment has already proven that free will is an illusion, and the link between epiphenomenalism and free will seems to me to be fundamental. For free will to be real, it would be necessary to have the power to make decisions that are outside the causality of the laws of physics, which is what the mind, in the definition of some, fits. We are made of matter and obey the deterministic laws of physics. I myself confess that I was shocked when I read about Libet’s experiment, because if it is proven to be true, then our consciousness / mind is totally useless in our actions. It’s like Ford says in Westworld: we are Passengers in our bodies. Consciousness is just an inert observer of the body’s actions. When you think of something, that thought is being caused by forces prior to it, it is not your “immaterial” mind that is causing it. Therefore, I find it absurd that philosophers still try to fit mental causation into actions based simply on intuition. This is also true for an AGI. The conscious AGI will be limited to your physical configurations. No decision she made would come from her mind, but from causality. Thus, the decision of an AGI to achieve a specific objective instead of all the others possible is defined by its physical properties (hardware configuration and data set).

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